Thus, Césaire's legacy is not as glorious as one might have believed following the extraordinary emotion shown by the people of Martinique when their old leader died in 2008. Césaire's prestige may be explained, first of all, by his capacity to understand the wishes of his people. He was the MP who advocated, at the French National Assembly, in favor of the law of March 19 th ,1946, which transformed the old French colonies of Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane and la Réunion in "departments". Césaire argued that the former colonies"never stop to integrate themselves more and more with the fatherland's civilization"(EcPol 1, p. 31 & 27). Césaire, at that time, had nothing to say against the "assimilation" of these territories and their inhabitants. "For those who would worry about the cultural future of the assimilated populations, we could tell them, after all, that what is called assimilation is just another form of mediation in history, and that the Gauls who were allowed to enter the city of Rome by the emperor Caracalla did not perform too badly in matters of civilization"(EcPol 1, p. 30).
In 1946, Césaire became a member of the PCF, the French Communist Party (he will remain in the party until 1956) and commended the assimilation of Martinique by France, an assimilation which, on his own mind, is, to tell the truth, more social than cultural. As a matter of fact, the big deal for which he was held accountable by the people of Martinique was to obtain the same social rights as the French of France (the "Metropolitans" Deferre's law on decentralization was voted on March 2 nd ,1982. It created a new level of local government, the region, which included several departments… except for the overseas departments transformed in"monodepartmental regions"! Césaire fought in vain against the "absurdity" of this institutional entanglement: "You are going to create two assemblies for one territory with almost the same powers, the same competencies. They will exert these competencies in the same field of action"(July 27th, 1981, EcPol 1, p. 234)! However, Césaire's protest against French centralization was more ancient, as we did notice, than the creation of the regions, which gave to him at least partial satisfaction. Already in 1958, in his report before the constitutive congress of the PPM (which he had created after he broke with the communists), he relied on Proudhon to explain that "Martinique's malaise [was] the malaise of a people who feels that he is no longer responsible for his own destiny, and that he is but a stooge of a drama in which he should be the protagonist" (EcPol 3, p. 21), before concluding that"the PPM could ask for the transformation of the overseas departments in federal regions 7 "(p. 28).
"In centralized governments, the attributes of the supreme power multiply, enlarge themselves and lend immediacy to themselves. . In view of the discrepancy between Martinique and the Metropole 9 , the incoming transfers from Metropole are especially important. And the risk is that they will diminish if Martinique decides to become more emancipated.
The inhabitants of Martinique, like the ones of the other overseas departments, are fully aware of that. That is why they constantly refuse any statutory reform involving a significant autonomy. In 2010, the populations of the overseas departments 10 have been consulted over the possible evolution of the said departments from the regime of Article 73 of the French constitution (on the overseas departments) towards Article 74 (on the other overseas territories): the answer was unanimously no. The fear of the neglect by the Metropole was stronger than the desire of autonomy. Today, autonomy is more a wish of the French government and of the local political elites than one of the populations themselves. Their opinion is ambivalent: the people want to remain part of a country which they simultaneously resent. Their rancor is nourished by many local politicians who remind them unceasingly of the slavery era. Césaire himself was first to play this tune as it is apparent in many discourses republished in his Political Writings. This is the key of the bargain with the Metropole: social peace against a growing assistance, a bargain which is meant to last. Thus, autonomy may rank first in the political programs of the local parties, but its real importance is secondary. Henceforth, the French government is ready to satisfy a demand for autonomy, and even to preempt it in the hope that overseas territories will become more and more able to solve themselves their problems. In 2003, a first constitutional revision had diminished the difference between the territories 11 governed under Articles 73 or 74 of the constitution by extending to the overseas departments the benefit of legislative capacity in a certain number of matters 12 . In 2008, a second revision introduced the possibility for the mono-departmental regions to melt two entities in a single "Collectivité unique" with a single assembly. Such was the case for the peoples of Martinique and French Guyana as previously indicated, without enthusiastic assent 13 , in spite of the quasi unanimity of the political staff favoring the change, because the attachment to the departmental system obtained in 1946 is still strong in the population.
When Césaire decided in favor of autonomy, he sincerely believed that it would bring a real progress to his island, according to the principle that there is no better government than self-government. It appears now that his hope was not fulfilled. The local politicians did not push much to enlarge their power of decision in economic matters. In Martinique, as elsewhere in the overseas territories, purchasing power is still dependent on public aid, i.e. the grants from the Metropole which are too many and too complex to be exactly measured. As a matter of fact, the local politicians have now well understood that the difficulties of Martinique are structural (overpopulation, too high level of life and labor cost leading to a society "consuming without producing", wages assimilable to a new slavery, unemployment) 14 . These structural obstacles will not disappear through simple institutional reforms.
